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1.0 RESEARCH PROGRAM OVERVIEW
This project is one of four interrelated projects that together form an overall
research program in cyberattack modeling. Figure 1 below illustrates the program’s
overall structure and flow.

Figure 1: Structure and flow of cyberattack modeling research project.
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In the first part of the overall research program, known computer system
vulnerabilities previously stored in standard vulnerability databases are input to a semiautomated process that generates extended fault trees that specify each vulnerability in a
logical and unambiguous way. Those extended fault trees are then converted into a
cyberattack model, or more precisely, a component of a cyberattack model that can be
executed as part of a simulation of a cyberattack.
The cyberattack model components are expressed in a customized extension of
Petri nets, referred to as attack nets. Attack nets are an extension of Petri nets [Petri,
1962] with additional features specific to modeling cyberattacks. Developed as part of
this overall research program, attack nets are based on another cyber-oriented Petri net
extension known as Petri nets with players [Zakrzewska, 2011].
Second, a subset of the cyberattack model components stored in a repository
containing many such components is automatically selected and composed (linked) so as
to model a particular target computer system. This process depends on metadata
associated with each model to guide both the selection and the composition.
Third, the assembled composite cyberattack model of the target computer system
is then validated as an accurate model of the target system by comparing the model and
target system, using multiple suitable validation methodologies.
Fourth, a validated cyberattack model is executed in order to simulate
cyberattacks on the target computer system. Multiple simulation iterations are used to
drive a machine learning algorithm by using reinforcement learning methods that
automatically learn and improve strategies to attack or defend the target computer
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system. The results of the simulations and the machine learning are optimum attack and
defense strategies for the system and an assessment of its vulnerabilities.
The students performing the research for each part of this program, and the degrees
they are pursuing, are as follows:


“Generating Cyberattack Model Components from Vulnerability Databases,” T.
Whitaker, Ph.D. Modeling and Simulation



“Selecting and Composing Cyberattack Model Components,” K. Mayfield,
Ph.D. Computer Science



“Validating Petri Net Models of Cyberattacks,” N. Christensen, M.S. Modeling and
Simulation



“Machine Learning of Cyberattack Strategies,” J. Bland, Ph.D. Computer
Engineering
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2.0 BACKGROUND ON VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
The process of verification and validation, referred to as V&V, is extremely
important in almost any modeling and simulation project. Verification is answering the
question of “Did we build the model right?” In other words, it is determining whether or
not the model was created correctly according to the requirements specifications given.
Validation is answering the question of “Did we build the right model?” It is determining
whether or not the model is an accurate representation of the simuland, which is the realworld object of interest being modeled [Petty, 2010]. The purpose of V&V is to ensure
that the model being used is credible and that the results are useful. Figure 2 below
shows the relationship between the stages of the modeling and simulation lifecycle and
verification and validation.

Figure 2: Verification is checking how well the executable model implements the
conceptual model. Validation is checking how well the conceptual model represents the
simuland and how well the results of the match the simuland [Petty, 2010].
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3.0 BACKGROUND ON PETRI NETS
This section summarizes important background information on Petri nets and their
properties.
3.1 BASIC STRUCTURE OF PETRI NETS
Petri nets are a graphical and mathematical modeling tool devised by Carl Adam
Petri in his 1962 dissertation. Since then, they have been used for many applications and
extended in many ways. They are a useful tool to model systems that have characteristics
such as concurrency, asynchronicity, and stochasticity. The basic form of a Petri net is a
directed, weighted, and bipartite graph consisting of two types of nodes called places and
transitions. Graphically, places are usually drawn as circles, and transitions are drawn as
bars or boxes. An arc can go from a place, known as the input place, to a transition or a
transition to a place, known as the output place. Each arc has a positive integer weight
assigned to it and is documented with a label, though labels for unity weights are usually
omitted. A marking, which indicates the state, is denoted by the placement of dots,
known as tokens, into places in the Petri net. The marking is denoted by M, which is an
m-vector with m being the total number of places, with the p-th component of M, denoted
by M(p), being the number of tokens in a specific place p [Murata, 1989].
Formally, the basic Petri net is defined as a 5-tuple, PN = (P, T, F, W, M0) where
P = {p1, p2, …, pm} is a finite set of places
T = {t1, t2, …, tn} is a finite set of transitions
F ⊆ (P ⨯ T) ⋃ (T ⨯ P) is a set of arcs
W∶ F → {1, 2, 3, …} is a weight function
M0∶ P → {0, 1, 2, 3, …} is the initial marking
15

P ⋂ T = ∅ and P ⋃ T ≠ ∅

[Murata, 1989].

Either P or T individually cannot be the empty set; that is P = ∅ or T = ∅ cannot be true, as
that would imply that the Petri net has no places or no transitions, respectively. Figure 3
below shows a basic Petri net with two places and one transition; place P0 is an input
place of transition T0 while place P1 is an output place of transition T0.

Figure 3: A basic Petri net created using the Platform Independent Petri net Editor (PIPE)
v4.3.0 software. The unity weights of the arcs are not omitted in this example.
The central rule to Petri nets governs transition enabling and firing. The
simulation of a dynamic system via state changes follows the transition rules below as
described by Murata:
1. A transition t is said to be enabled if each input place p of t is marked with at least
W(p, t) tokens, where W(p, t) is the weight of the arc from p to t.
2. An enabled transition may or may not fire (depending on whether or not the event
actual takes place).
3. A firing of an enabled transition t removes W(p, t) tokens from each input place p
of t, and adds W(t, p) tokens to each output place p, where W(t, p) is the weight of
the arc from t to p.
This transition firing rule is important to understand before a Petri net structure can be
constructed and then execution sequences analyzed. Figure 4 on the next page
demonstrates a basic firing sequence, which also has the property of being deadlocked
(explained in section 3.2.3).
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 4: An example of a firing sequence from places P0 and P1 back to place P0 via
transitions T0, T1 (arbitrarily chosen), and T3. This Petri net was created using PIPE v4.3.0.
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3.2 PROPERTIES OF PETRI NETS
The various properties of a Petri net can be found in an analysis of the net
structure. Formally, the net structure is defined as the set of places, transitions, and arcs:
N = {P, T, F} [Reisig, 2010].
Graphically, the net structure is the placement of all the places, transitions, and arcs
without any markings. According to Callou, et al., there is a series of five Petri net
structures called elementary nets that are used as the building blocks for more complex
Petri nets. They are as shown in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5: The five elementary net structures in the figure are defined in [Callou, 2012]:
(a) sequence, (b) fork, (c) synchronization, (d) choice, and (e) merging.
Each of these structures can be combined together to create more complex Petri nets
[Callou, 2012]. The net structure can also be represented using a two-dimensional matrix
called the incidence matrix, usually denoted W [Murata, 1984] [Hardy, 2008]. One
dimension is the number of places while the other dimension is the number of transitions
in the net structure. Each element wij in W represents a weighted arc from transition j to
place i (if the element is positive) or from place i to transition j (if the element is
negative) [Hardy, 2008].
18

Once the net structure has been defined, formal analysis of the Petri net can be
performed. There are several Petri net properties that can be analyzed, but the main
properties according to Murata are reachability, boundedness, liveness, and invariants.
3.2.1 REACHABILITY
When an enabled transition is fired, the overall marking of the Petri net is
changed according to the transition firing rules described earlier. The firing sequence is a
series of transitions enabling and firing to move tokens from M0 to Mn. A specific
marking Mn is considered reachable in a Petri net if can be reached from a starting
marking M0 through some firing sequence [Murata, 1984].
The reachability graph of a Petri net is a graph with nodes that represent all the
reachable markings in the Petri net. The nodes are connected together by immediate
reachability relation, that is, if a marking is able to be reached by only one transition
firing from the previous node, it is connected to. The mathematical relation for the
immediate reachability is given by
(Mi, Mj) ∈ F ⇔ Mi → Mj [Suciu, 1998].
Figure 6 on the next page is a sample Petri net created by Suciu to demonstrate a
simple interactive system with a queue. She uses the initial marking M0 = [3, 0, 1, 0] to
indicate that the system has three terminals and one server. Figure 7, also on the next
page, is the reachability graph for the Petri net in Figure 6, with the same initial marking.
The reachability graph can be traversed to exhaustively determine all reachable markings
within the Petri net. This method can only be applied to a bounded net and usually only
if the number of reachable markings is not too large [Suciu, 1998].
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Figure 6: A sample Petri net of an interactive system [Suciu, 1998].

Figure 7: The reachability graph for the Petri net in Figure 6 [Suciu, 1998].
3.2.2 BOUNDEDNESS
The boundedness of a Petri net is simply the maximum number of tokens any one
place in the net can have. A Petri net is said to be k-bounded if the number of tokens in
each place does not exceed a finite number k. Furthermore, a Petri net is said to be safe
or 1-bounded if the maximum number of tokens is one [Murata, 1984]. Figure 8 on the
next page gives an example of an unbounded Petri net, one that has no limit on the total
number of tokens.
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(a)

(c)

(b)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

Figure 8: An example of an unbounded Petri net created in PIPE v4.3.0. Note how new
tokens are created and put into place P0 as the Petri net is executed.
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In Figure 8 on the previous page, the Petri net is initially marked with a token in
place P0, which enables transition T1 as seen in (a). When transition T1 fires, it removes
the token from P0 and places a token in places P1 and P2, which in turn will enable
transitions T0 and T2 respectively, seen in (b). Next, because only one transition may fire
at a time, transition T0 will fire, removing the token from place P1 and placing a token
back in place P0, seen in (c). Then transition T2 fires, removing the token from place P2
and putting another token in place P0, which now has two tokens in it. The firing
sequence will then continue over and over, and tokens will accumulate in place P0 as
there is no restriction on the limit of tokens it can have, thus, the place, and therefore the
Petri net, is unbounded.
3.2.3 LIVENESS
The liveness of a Petri net means that it is possible to fire any transition of the net
through some firing sequence from the current marking, no matter what marking has been
reached from M0. A deadlock occurs when a transition can no longer fire in a firing
sequence from the current marking. Figure 4 earlier and Figure 9 on the next page
demonstrate simple examples of a deadlocked transition. In Figure 4, the deadlock
occurs because transition T0 can only be enabled if both places P0 and P1 are marked
with a token. When the firing sequence progresses through transitions T0 to place P2,
then through transition T1 to place P3, and finally through transition T3 back to place P0,
there will be a token in place P0 but not in place P1, which is not sufficient to enable
transition T0 again after that firing sequence. Furthermore, all transitions are no longer
able to be fired once the net reaches the final state, so the Petri net is considered to be in a
deadlocked state.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Figure 9: The firing sequence shown will lead to a deadlock of transition T0.
Initially, the Petri net in Figure 9 is marked in place P0 with a token, with
transition T0 enabled. Once the token is moved to place P1, transition T0 is no longer
enabled. Because the token will now move through transition T1 into place P2 and then
through transition T2 back into place P1, transition T0 will never be firable again as place
P0 cannot receive another token to enable that transition. So a deadlock occurs because
transition T0 is no longer firable in any future firing sequence.
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A live Petri net is considered deadlock-free. Each transition t in the Petri net can
be classified with one of five liveness conditions:
1. dead (L0-live) if t can never be fired in any firing sequence
2. L1-live (potentially firable) if t can be fired at least once in some firing
sequence
3. L2-live if, given any positive integer k, t can be fired at least k times in some
firing sequence
4. L3-live if t appears infinitely often in some firing sequence
5. L4-live or live if t is L1-live for every marking M in the net

[Murata,

1984].
Each firing sequence mentioned in the above liveness conditions are assumed to
start from the initial marking M0. If every transition in the Petri net has the same liveness
condition, then that liveness condition can be applied to the entire Petri net. For example,
in Figure 4 earlier once the firing sequence has finished, transition T0 can no longer be
enabled as there is no token in place P1 to enable transition T0 again, which prevents any
future firing sequences from occurring, so the entire Petri net is considered deadlocked.
3.2.4 INVARIANTS
Petri nets can have two kinds of invariant properties: place invariants, or pinvariants, and transition invariants, or t-invariants. These two properties are dynamic
structural properties that can be determined from the incidence matrix W. They are called
invariants because they describe quantities that do not change even when transitions are
fired. The p-invariants describe conservation components, for which the total number of
tokens within a given sub-net of the overall Petri net does not change. In other words, a
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p-invariant is a set of places in which the number of tokens remains constant for every
reachable marking. A p-invariant is a positive vector x that is a solution of the following
matrix equation:
x∙W=0

[Hardy, 2008].

A Petri net’s t-invariants describe repetitive components, which are sets of
transitions that cause a given sub-net of the overall Petri net to return to a previous
marking. “In other words, all the firings of the transitions of a repetitive component
together have a null effect on the markings of the model” [Hardy, 2008]. It can be
indicative of cyclic behavior within the system, which can be described as the basic
behavior of the system [Heiner, 2004a]. A t-invariant is a positive vector y that is a
solution of the following matrix equation:
W∙y=0

[Hardy, 2008].

The above properties are known as behavioral properties of the Petri net. They
require initial markings and that the Petri net be run, or stepped through, in order to be
analyzed. Figure 8 earlier demonstrates a t-invariant as markings in place P0 will end up
back in place P0 no matter which firing sequence is performed. The same Petri net does
not demonstrate a p-invariant as the total number of tokens increases as the model is
executed. The Petri net in Figure 9, however, does demonstrate a p-invariant as the total
number of tokens remains unchanged throughout the execution of the model. Figure 9
also demonstrates a t-invariant as the token starting in place P1 will always end up back
in place P1, no matter how many future transitions fire.
Another classification of properties is structural properties. Structural properties
are those that depend only on the topological structure of the Petri net and are
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independent of the initial marking M0. Thus, they can be characterized solely with the
net structure and/or incidence matrix. Murata gives structurally bounded, conservative,
repetitive, and consistent as examples of structural properties.
3.2.5 STRUCTURALLY BOUNDED
A Petri net is said to be structurally bounded if, for any finite M0, the Petri net is
bounded [Murata, 1989]. As stated earlier, bounded means that the Petri net’s places
have a maximum number of allowed tokens. The Petri net in Figure 10 below is
considered structurally bound if it is 2-bounded; however note that it has no initial
marking. Since the net is considered to be 2-bounded, the initial marking can have up to
two tokens put into any of the four places P0, P1, P2, or P3 as long as two of the four
places have tokens in them. If only a single place has two tokens, the Petri net will not be
able to execute as transition T1 requires a token in a minimum of two separate places,
specifically one of P0 or P1 and one of P2 or P3. It does not matter where the initial
marking places the tokens, the Petri net will still be structurally bound.

Figure 10: A structurally bounded Petri net, created in PIPE v4.3.0.
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3.2.6 CONSERVATIVE
A Petri net is said to be conservative if there exists a fixed number of tokens
throughout the Petri net as it executes for any initial marking M0. If this condition is only
true for some places in the Petri net, but not all, the Petri net is said to be partially
conservative [Murata, 1989]. This property is distinguished from p-invariants as pinvariants depend on a specific M0, while a net being conservative does not depend on
M0. The Petri net in Figure 10 exhibits the property of being conservative, as the number
of tokens in the net remains constant no matter how many transition firings occur.
3.2.7 REPETITIVE
A Petri net is said to be repetitive if there exists some M0 with a firing sequence
starting with M0 such that every transition in that firing sequence occurs infinitely often.
If only some of the transitions, but not every transition, in the firing sequence occur
infinitely, often then the Petri net is said to be partially repetitive [Murata, 1989]. This
property is distinguished from t-invariants as a Petri net’s repetitiveness does not depend
on any specific M0, while t-invariants require a specific M0. Again, the Petri net in Figure
10 exhibits the property of being repetitive as there exists some M0 such that the
transitions will fire infinitely. As long as two separate places have tokens in them, at
least one of the three transitions will be enabled and able to fire. An example firing
sequence would be, assuming places P0 and P2 have two tokens in them each, P0 -> T0 > P1 -> T1 -> P2 -> T2 -> P3 -> T1 -> P0 -> T0…, which is a firing sequence that would
repeat each transition an infinite number of times if the Petri net were to execute forever.
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3.2.8 CONSISTENT
A Petri net is said to be consistent if there exists some M0 with a firing sequence
starting with M0 such that every transition will fire at least once in that firing sequence.
This is actually a special case of repetitiveness, where the transitions must fire at least
once but not necessarily an infinite number of times as in repetitiveness. If only some of
the transitions, not all, in the firing sequence fire at least once, then the Petri net is said to
be partially consistent [Murata, 1989]. Because the Petri net in Figure 10 is repetitive, it
is also consistent as in a firing sequence. Each transition is fired at least once, in fact,
each transition would be fired an infinite number of times should the execution of the
Petri net continue forever.
3.3 TYPES OF PETRI NETS
There have been many extensions and modifications of Petri nets since their
original definition by Petri. Only a few of these extensions are described in this paper:
time Petri nets, timed Petri nets, stochastic Petri nets, colored Petri nets, and Petri nets
with players.
3.3.1 TIME PETRI NETS
The original Petri net formalism does not consider timing in transition firing.
Each transition, if only one is enabled, would fire instantaneously. However, if multiple
transitions are enabled simultaneously, then the Petri net will need some way to decide
which transition to fire, as only one transition may fire at a time under normal firing
rules. Time Petri nets provide a new firing rule by associating a pair of firing times with
each transition: an earliest firing time (EFT) and a latest firing time (LFT). If two times,
a and b with 0 ≤ a ≤ b, are set as parameters, and transition t has been last enabled at
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global time θ, then the EFT is θ+a and the LFT is θ+b [Berthomieu, 1983]. If a different
transition is enabled, then the time θ will be updated to the time when the new transition
was enabled. The symbol θ here is a placeholder for an arbitrary time-step in the timeline
for the time Petri net model.
A state in a time Petri net must be described with two parameters, the marking Mi
and a firing interval function I, where I is bounded by the earliest and latest firing times.
A transition in a time Petri net is fired when two conditions are held:
1. The transition is enabled;
2. Time θ is comprised (bounds included) between the EFT of transition t and
the smallest of the LFTs among those of the transitions enabled [Berthomieu,
1983].
In essence, a transition can fire if and only if the transition is enabled and is within the
firing time interval specified by the earliest and shortest of the latest firing times
[Berthomieu, 1983].
3.3.2 TIMED PETRI NETS
Much like time Petri nets, timed Petri nets are an extension of Petri nets that adds
a non-zero time duration to the firing of a transition. However, rather than firing within
some future time interval, a timed Petri net associates a bounded, non-zero time value to
each transition. This time value may be in real time using a fixed number of seconds, or
drawn from a uniform distribution. In order to fire such a transition, it must be enabled,
much as in a normal Petri net. However, once the transition is enabled, it is said that the
firing can be initiated rather than immediately removing a token from the input place and
putting a token in the output places. Once a transition firing is initiated, the token is
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removed from the input place. It is then when the transition is labeled as executing. An
executing transition lasts for the duration of the firing time associated with the transition.
At the end of this firing time, the firing of the transition is said to be terminated, and once
terminated, a token is placed on each output place. Ramchandani claims that this process
can be visualized by replacing every transition with two transitions and an intermediate
place. A token is held in the intermediate place for the time length equal to the firing
time of the original transition. In addition, whenever a transition is enabled, it creates a
new entry in a firing schedule, which is a type of future event list used to record when
transitions may fire [Ramchandani, 1974].
3.3.3 STOCHASTIC PETRI NETS
Stochastic Petri nets are another variant of Petri nets that add a time element to
transition firing. Instead of a fixed time interval or fixed time delay on each transition,
stochastic Petri nets use an exponential probability distribution to determine the rate of
transition firing. If two or more transitions are enabled simultaneously, then whichever
transition gets the shorter of the firing times from the exponential distribution fires first.
The next marking of the stochastic Petri net depends on which transition “wins the race”
[Bause, 2002]. Bause does not discuss when the other enabled transition will fire after
the first transition is fired, only mentioning what the next marking of the net will be.
Additionally, the reachability graph of a stochastic Petri net can be converted to an
equivalent Markov chain with the transition firing times being replaced with the different
rate parameters for the exponentially distributed probability function [Bause, 2002]
[Murata, 1984].
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3.3.4 COLORED PETRI NETS
The original Petri net formalism, sometimes known as elementary Petri nets
[Reisig, 2010], contains only one type of token, typically depicted as a black dot. It does
not distinguish between different types of tokens. Colored Petri nets, on the other hand,
attach a data value and type known as the token color to each token. Each place in the
net may only ever contain one color of tokens, known as the color set of the place, so
multiple differently colored tokens may not share the same place. The color set may be
simple, such as only integers or strings, or it may be more complex, such as a record
containing multiple lesser color sets, for instance, a record may contain an integer for a
sequence number and a generic data container [Jensen, 2009].
Colored Petri nets are useful for modeling complex systems that contain many
different components working together because the colored Petri net combines the
descriptive power of Petri nets with the data manipulation of programming languages
[Kristensen, 1998] [Jensen, 2015]. Specifically, the use of colored tokens allows for type
checking, and the use of color sets, arc expressions, and guards allows the modeler to
handle complex data in a more convenient way as well as specify the interaction between
the data and system behavior using syntax and semantics known from programming
languages. Colored tokens also allow the colored Petri nets to distinguish and model
different processes within the same subnet [Jensen, 2015].
3.3.5 PETRI NETS WITH PLAYERS
Zakrzewska and Ferragut present the extended Petri net formalism most relevant
to this thesis in their work on Petri nets with players (PNP) for cyberattack modeling
[Zakrzewska, 2011]. In this formalism, Petri nets are extended to include player activity
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with player-controlled transitions alongside stochastic non-controlled transitions, adding
a game theoretic component to stochastic Petri nets. Each transition controlled by a
player is assigned a player strategy while each non-controlled transition has a firing rate
with an exponential probability distribution. The set of player strategies is a mapping
from the markings of observed places (places that the player can see) to assignments of
firing rates for player-controlled transitions. According to Zakrzewska and Ferragut, the
player’s objective is to get the Petri net into a state that gives that player the greatest gain.
Petri nets with players are able to model both the defender and attacker as two players in
the system alongside non-player controlled consequences of the actions of the players
[Zakrzewska, 2011].
Figure 11 on page 34 is the sample PNP that Zakrzewska created. In this
example, a cyberattacker can perform one of two types of structured query language
(SQL) injection attacks. The place labeled “blind sql occurring 0 tokens” is connected to
transitions labeled “detect rate=r1” and “succeed rate=r3,” and the place labeled “sql
occurring 0 tokens” is connected to the transitions labeled “detect rate=r2” and “succeed
rate=r4.” For this example, the transitions labeled with a detect rate are considered
controlled by the defender while the transitions labeled with a succeed rate are controlled
by the attacker. A strategy for this example is the collection of rates assigned to the
detect rate transitions (for the defender) and the succeed rate transitions (for the attacker).
For this figure, the detect rate r1 could be given a rate of 3 and detect rate r2 is given a
rate of 5, while succeed rate r3 is given a rate of 3 with succeed rate r4 given a rate of 4.
The transition labeled “detect rate=r2” is located after the place labeled “system monitors
1 tokens,” so it would have a higher rate of detection than the transition labeled “detect
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rate=r1,” which occurs before the place for system monitoring because the defender’s
system is actively monitoring the attack. If the SQL database has a lack of input
validation, then the transition labeled “succeed rate=r4” would have higher rate assigned
to it as a lack of input validation means that a SQL injection attack will be easier to
perform [Zakrzewska, 2011].
The transition firing rates are controlled by observed tokens and bound by rate
limits. That is, an attacker or defender will only be able to observe specific places in the
net, which correspond to the state of the system. For example, an attacker may not be
able to detect that the system he or she is attacking is actively monitoring his or her
attack. Each transition also has a maximum firing rate limit, such that the player
controlling that transition cannot raise the firing rate above the limit. In Figure 11, the
attacker can observe the places “database with sql queries 1 tokens,” “blind sql occuring
0 tokens,” “attacker has access 1 tokens,” “lack of input validation 1 tokens,”
“informative error messages 1 tokens,” “sql occuring 0 tokens,” and “injection successful
0 tokens.” The defender can observe the places “blind sql occuring 0 tokens,” “system
monitors 1 tokens,” and “sql occuring 0 tokens.” Therefore, an attacker may conduct an
attack but not know that the defender is monitoring the system, whereas a defender might
not be aware that the attacker already has access to the system until the system can detect
and report the intrusion [Zakrzewska, 2011].
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Figure 11: A simplified PNP of a SQL injection attack [Zakrzewska, 2011].
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4.0 LITERATURE SURVEY
This section contains a survey literature on validating Petri net models and
validating cybersecurity models. Most of the methods of validation surveyed fall into
one of four broad categories: formal analysis, comparison with another model,
comparison with the simuland itself, and validation by simulation. See Table 1 below.
Table 1: Categorization of validation methods from each source surveyed.
Source
Petri Net Based Model Validation in
Systems Biology [Heiner, 2004a]
Model Validation of Biological
Pathways Using Petri Nets—
Demonstrated for Apoptosis
[Heiner, 2004b]
Validation of Petri Net Apoptosis
Models Using P-Invariant Analysis
[Low, 2009]
Petri Net-based Method for the
Analysis of the Dynamics of Signal
Propagation in Signaling Pathways
[Hardy, 2008]
Petri Nets are Good for Protocols
[Courtiat, 1984]

Petri net or
Cybersecurity
Petri net
Petri net

Validation Method
t-invariant analysis (formal
analysis)
t-invariant analysis (formal
analysis)

Petri net

p-invariant analysis (formal
analysis)

Petri net

p-invariant and t-invariant analysis
(formal analysis) and topological
analysis (formal analysis)

Petri net

Formal analysis of structural
properties; projection method of
analysis
Comparison of Petri net model of
cluster with actual cluster of up to
four machines (comparison with
simuland)
Static validation: distinguishing
semantic incompleteness (formal
analysis)
Dynamic validation: clarifying
existence of semantic
incorrectness (formal analysis)
Validation by formally checking
rules for conflicts and redundancy
(formal analysis) and
comparison with simuland data
Using cause-effect graphing to
generate test cases (formal
analysis)
Comparison against another
model of detailed discrete-event
simulation of Bluetooth worms

Exploiting Programmable Network
Interfaces for Parallel Query
Execution in Workstation Clusters
[Kumar, 2006]
Fuzzy Petri Nets for Human
Behavior Verification and
Validation [Kouzehgar, 2011]

Petri net

Application of Colored Petri Net in
Spam-Filter Rules Property
Detection [Liu, 2010]

Petri net

A Test Case Generator for the
Validation of High-Level Petri Nets
[Desel, 1997]
Modeling Propagation Dynamics of
Bluetooth Worms (Extended
Version) [Yan, 2009]

Petri net

Petri net

Cybersecurity
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Cyber Security Quantification
Model [Khan, 2010]

Cybersecurity

Model-Based Validation of an
Intrusion-Tolerant Information
System [Stevens, 2004]
Petri Net Modeling of CyberPhysical Attacks on Smart Grid
[Chen, 2011]
Detection and Modeling of Cyber
Attacks with Petri Nets [Jasiul,
2014]
Modeling and Analyzing Security
Patterns Using High Level Petri
Nets [He, 2016]

Petri net;
Cybersecurity
Petri net;
Cybersecurity
Petri net;
Cybersecurity
Petri net;
Cybersecurity

Calibrated and then comparison
with simuland data from an email
server running for 10 years
Calibrated and then comparison
with simuland
Proof-of-concept program was
written to check model (validation
by simulation)
Comparison with simuland data
collected via honeypot infected
with case study malware
Formal analysis of structural
properties, specifically liveness

Some sources in the literature claim validation was performed, but no details were
given on how the validation was done. In others, it is not clear whether the method
described was validation or verification. Petri nets as a modeling technique have been
applied to many different areas of study, ranging from systems biology and human
behavior studies to computer systems and cybersecurity malware modeling. As such, the
individual validation methods may vary, but because Petri nets are a well-known
mathematical modeling technique, some validation methods are shared.
4.1 NON-CYBERSECURITY PETRI NET MODEL VALIDATION
The first several sources surveyed cover Petri net models used in systems biology.
Both [Heiner, 2004a] and [Heiner, 2004b] describe a method of validating Petri net
models on apoptosis in systems biology by calculating the t-invariants to find cyclic
system behavior. Heiner and Koch claim that any cyclic system behavior can be broken
down into a positive linear combination of basic behavior. However, they do not define
what a positive linear combination of basic behavior is. In [Heiner, 2004b], the tinvariants are describing the basic system behavior because they represent the linearly
independent solutions of the system of linear equations produced with the incidence
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matrix. The linear combination of independent solutions would also be a solution of the
system of linear equations. Once the linear combination is obtained, then one can
compare the calculated basic behavior from the Petri net with the expected basic behavior
of the simuland to validate the model. For the biochemical case studies in the source, the
t-invariants must be interpreted in a biological context, such as the elementary modes of
biochemical pathways.
As a follow-up to the research in [Heiner, 2004b], validation of Petri net models
for apoptosis using place-invariant, or p-invariant, analysis is presented in [Low, 2009].
The p-invariant analysis identifies sub-networks in the overall Petri net that are
conservatory; that is, they maintain a fixed number of tokens. Also, the model needs to
have been structured in such a way to control the flow of tokens into and out of the Petri
net by not using source or sink transitions, which are transitions without an input place or
output place respectively, to prevent an uncontrolled weighted sum of tokens, thus
making the Petri net unbounded, which would make p-invariant analysis impossible. The
paper does not explain how an uncontrolled weighted sum of tokens makes p-invariant
analysis impossible, only that it does. It does mention, however, that an unregulated flow
of tokens into or out of the net would make p-invariant analysis impossible, which makes
sense as p-invariants measure how tokens are conserved within the Petri net. If more
tokens are being introduced into the net than are being removed, then there would be a
net gain of tokens, and vice versa. Much like the t-invariant analysis presented in
[Heiner, 2004a] and [Heiner, 2004b], it is necessary to interpret the p-invariants for the
biological system being studied. In the model presented in [Low, 2009], places that are
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connected in a p-invariant are considered to be potentially connected by the same
biological signal.
Hardy and Robillard present a method using Petri nets to analyze the dynamics of
signal propagation in models of signal transduction networks in systems biology. Both
invariant analysis and topological analysis are used. The invariants must be interpreted in
terms of the simuland to be useful for analysis; in [Hardy, 2008], invariants represent
either mass conservation of biochemical compounds or a cyclic pathway. According to
the authors, invariant analyses “decompose a discrete Petri net model into biologically
significant subnets, thus providing insights into the architecture of signaling pathways,”
which is performed using only the net structure without need for running a simulation of
the model [Hardy, 2008].
Instead of modeling biological systems, Courtiat, Ayache, and Algayres perform
two methods of validation on Petri net models of communication protocols. One method
is enumerative and structural analysis of the Petri net, which involves checking
boundedness and liveness for enumerative analysis and analyzing place invariants and
transition invariants for structural analysis. An unbounded Petri net would have an
infinite number of markings, which correspond to different states, and thus would be an
unreasonable model for a protocol, so ensuring that the Petri net is bounded is essential.
The liveness of a Petri net for protocols ensures that a message transmission is always
possible. The second method of validation in [Courtiart, 1984] was performing a
projection on the global Petri net model, which is the layer of the model that connects
each local entity model with the service model on the lower layer. However, the source
only describes that the projection method involves creating an abstract view of the Petri
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net, called the interpretation model, which is removing any events and transitions that are
not associated with the upper layer, i.e., to service primitives [Courtiat, 1984]. There is
no explanation of how they determined which events and transitions are associated with
the service primitives forming an interpretation model and which are not. Once the
interpretation model is constructed, it is compared with a reference service specification,
a document that specifies the service to be provided. This comparison can be done
directly on a state automaton, which is obtained by the projection, or on a regular
language defined by the state automaton, although it is cautioned that it is not always
possible to have strict equality between the two languages, and some care must be taken
to ensure that the regular expressions of the protocol language belong to the reference
service automaton as well. The authors do not give any measure of how different the two
languages have to be before they are considered incorrect. The state automaton is not
clearly defined either, only that it is produced by the projection method. It is also
stressed that the projection method only ensures partial correctness of the protocol and
must be combined with structural analysis to formally validate the model [Courtiat,
1984].
Kumar, Thazhuthaveetil, and Govindarajan used a stochastic timed Petri net
model of cluster computing to evaluate the performance of TPC-H queries being
executed on a high-end cluster. The model was validated by comparing the results of the
model against an actual execution of a hash join, which is a type of join algorithm used in
database queries and included in the TPC-H query suite, on a cluster of up to four
machines by informally comparing the results directly. No statistical test was performed.
The cluster machines had identical specifications, and tests were run on a single machine,
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a two-machine cluster, and a four-machine cluster. The results of the validation testing
show that the actual execution time and Petri net simulation execution time differed less
than 16%, which was explained as an overhead incurred by a non-blocking receive in the
cluster. This overhead was not explicitly modeled in the Petri net, although the authors
do not say why [Kumar, 2006].
More Petri net validation methods were presented in a source on human behavior
modeling. Kouzehgar, Badamchizadeh, and Khanmohammadi perform verification and
validation on Petri nets that use fuzzy rule sets to model human behavior in a professorstudent interaction case study. They explicitly claim that verification of Petri net models
involves generating and searching the reachability graph while validating Petri net
models involves reasoning through the model. Furthermore, verification looks for
structural errors, such as incompleteness, inconsistency, circularity, and redundancy
while validation looks for semantic errors, such as incompleteness and incorrectness.
Two validation types are presented: static validation and dynamic validation. Both types
refer to the same validation referent, which is gathered from the subject matter expert
with a series of questionnaires, and then the results of the questionnaires are converted
into fuzzy truth values. The validation referent is created by having the subject matter
experts, the students in this study, answer questions about the professor using an
evaluation survey, which are the input properties of the referent. These answers are then
used to perform fuzzy deduction to deduce the internal properties, which are given as the
power of teaching, regularity, behavior, and the power of attracting the student, of the
referent and the professor’s rank based on internal and input properties. According to
Kouzehgar, et al., the difference between static and dynamic validation is in whether or
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not the Petri net model is actually run. Static validation looks for semantic
incompleteness by searching through places for their properties, which are the internal
and input properties defined above, and comparing the results with the referent, without
running the Petri net. If there is a mismatch in the number of searched input properties
when compared with the expected ones, then the rule base may be missing antecedents or
consequents. Dynamic validation, on the other hand, looks for semantic incompleteness
by running the Petri net model with specific inputs and comparing the results of the Petri
net run with the referent. The reference values were taken from the eleven-question
student questionnaire, which was answered using linguistic values: very low, low,
medium, high, and very high. These linguistic values were assigned a numeric value and
then multiplied by a certainty factor, which was obtained by asking the students how
confident they were of their answers in percent form. The truth degrees of the
antecedents in the referent were minimized because each question in the questionnaire
was grouped with other questions to form a set and then multiplied by the certainty value
to get the truth degree of the consequent. If the result of this calculation is less than the
condition provided by the referent, then the validation fails; otherwise, it succeeds
[Kouzehgar, 2011].
Another rule-based Petri net model is used to analyze rule-bases for email spam
filters by Liu, Zhang, Wei, and Zhang. The model allows for anomalies in the rule-base
to be detected, from rules redundancy to circular rules. The authors defined redundant
rules as two rules with the same input conditions and one rule being a sub-set of the other
rule. The definition for conflicting rules was not as clear, however. In the example rule
base, several rules were redundant or were in conflict when the authors analyzed the
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model of the rule base. The same rules in the actual rule base were also in conflict and
redundant; thus, the authors claimed the Petri net model was validated by comparing the
results of the model, which found conflicting rules, with the simuland, which is assumed
to have no conflicting rules. The authors were not clear in exactly how they performed
the comparison [Liu, 2010].
Desel, et al., propose using a technique derived from cause-effect graphing, which
they call cause-effect nets, to validate Petri nets, using test cases. Instead of representing
the relationship between causes and effects by using a Boolean graph, their method uses a
low-level Petri net. The cause-effect net is made in a two-step process; first, the natural
language specification is read to find causes and effects that are modeled as conditions in
the cause-effect net; second, the causes and effects are linked together using relationships
specifying an OR-, AND-, SINGLE-, or ALTERNATE- relationship. Once the causeeffect net is created, a test case table is generated automatically by running the causeeffect net simulation, which produces a special kind of Petri net known as process net.
The process nets describe “a relationship between an effect and its causes” [Desel, 1997].
Furthermore, a process net describes only a single behavior of the system being modeled
or of the Petri net being validated. These process nets are represented as columns in the
test case table, with each net being interpreted as a specific test case. The test cases are
then examined by manually transforming the causes of a test case to initialized markings
of the Petri net and then generating process nets. Then the final markings of the process
net are checked to see if they correspond to the effect. If this is the case, then the test
case finds no error. This procedure is repeated until all process nets are run, and if the
final markings of all generated process nets correspond to the effects of the test case
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table, then the model is validated by finding no errors. However, it is important to note
that the authors claim that even the cause-effect net itself must be validated to ensure the
correctness and completeness of the test case generator [Desel, 1997].
4.2 NON-PETRI NET CYBERSECURITY MODEL VALIDATION
In the area of cybersecurity, an analytical model for the propagation of Bluetooth
worms was developed by Yan and Eidenbenz and validated by checking the results of the
analytical solutions of their model against an existing discrete-event Bluetooth worm
simulator: the ns-2 network simulation with the UCBT Bluetooth module. The data from
the analytical solution was tabulated with four different mobility scenarios and two sets
of Bluetooth worm parameter settings to model infecting 20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% of
the population of Bluetooth devices. Furthermore, the numerical solutions produced
infection curves that matched up with the curves that the ns-2 network simulator with the
UCBT Bluetooth module produced. However, there were three assumptions made about
the model to simplify it: 1) only one infection can occur at a time, even if multiple
devices could be infected simultaneously, 2) modeling human mobility was only an
approximation as it is very difficult to precisely model human mobility, and 3) more
realistic conditions were not considered, such as normal Bluetooth traffic, human
involvement in the propagation process, and device states other than susceptible and
infected. In addition, the model was only predicting average infection curves, without
considering stochastic variance of the infection curves. The infection curves produced
were overlaid with the infection curves produced from the discrete-event simulation to
show that the proposed analytical model was able to predict the propagation dynamics to
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a high degree of accuracy for less computational cost, given the assumptions mentioned
[Yan, 2009].
Khan and Hussain present a set of numerical models for cybersecurity: one for
vulnerability of a given system, one for the number of attacks occurring at a specific
time, one for the reliability of the system at a specific time, one for the threat (which is a
cyberattacker motivated to exploit a system vulnerability) at a specific time, one for the
consequence of an attack occurring at a specific time, and finally one for the risk at a
specific time. Each model is parameterized based on the system being modeled.
Vulnerability is defined as “the presence of faults or errors that may cause harm to a
system” and the probability of a vulnerability at time τ is given by 𝑃𝑉 =

𝑉(𝜏)
𝑉

where V is

the total number of vulnerabilities [Khan, 2010]. The number of attacks is assumed to
follow Poisson’s law and is given by 𝑃𝐴 (𝜏) = 𝑒 −𝜆𝜏 ∗

(𝜆𝜏)𝜆𝜏
(𝜆𝜏)!

, where λ is the interarrival

rate of attacks. Reliability is defined as the “characteristic of goodness” of the system
[Khan, 2010]. If f is the failure rate of the system, then the reliability of the system at
time τ is given by 𝑅𝑒𝑙(𝜏) = 𝑒 −𝑓𝜏 . The probability of a threat occurring at time τ is
given by 𝑃𝑇 (𝜏) = 𝑃𝑉 (𝜏) ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑙(𝜏). The consequence of an attack that occurred at time
𝑃 (𝜏)

τ is given by 𝐶 (𝜏) = 𝑃𝐴(𝜏). The risk at time τ is given as 𝑃𝑅 (𝜏) = 𝑃𝑉 (𝜏) ∗ 𝑃𝑇 (𝜏) ∗ 𝐶 (𝜏).
𝑇

The authors had obtained and analyzed ten years of data from the SZABIST Islamabad
Campus email server. Each year was considered a time index, and the total number of
vulnerabilities that were exploited by specific types of attacks was counted. The types of
cyberattacks that were considered were as follows: Denial of Service, Virus, Probe,
Account Compromise, Packet Sniffer, Root Compromise, Trojan Horse, Worm, Spyware,
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and Corruption of Database. The data was input into MATLAB and then analyzed to
provide the values of the parameters for their model. Once the models were
parameterized, they were then plotted and cross-checked with the plot of the real world
email server data set to validate the model [Khan, 2010].
4.3 CYBERSECURITY PETRI NET MODEL VALIDATION
Stevens, et al., use a variant of Petri nets known as stochastic activity networks to
validate an intrusion-tolerant information system, or a computer system that is resistant to
cyberattacks. The model of the system has two clients communicating with a core
through a network. Each client may have multiple processes running, where each process
is its own sub-model. The model of the attacks are represented by different sub-models
within the system model: an attack_discovery model for the discovery of new
vulnerabilities, and an attack_propagation model for how an attack can progress through
the system. The attack_discovery model has an activity to generate a new discovery of a
vulnerability, using a value of the mean time to discovery (MTTD) of a new
vulnerability. The model also included a mean time between successive exploitations of
a known vulnerability (MTTE), which was initially set to five minutes. While no
validation of the model itself is performed, the method of validating the computer
system’s security using the model is probabilistic modeling involving parameters such as
the mean time before a server is compromised or mean time between the discoveries of
vulnerabilities in the system. The authors were checking the security of the system by
measuring the probability of successful attacks over different periods of time using their
model. They found that if the average time between discoveries of new vulnerabilities
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was longer than one day, the system would process correctly 95% of the time [Stevens,
2004].
Chen, Sanchez-Aarnoutse, and Buford present a Petri net model for the smart
grid, which is composed of multiple low-level Petri nets. They claim that the low-level
Petri nets are created by domain experts who specialize in limited fields, such as physical
attacks on smart meters or cyberattacks on substations. Once the low-level Petri nets are
created, they can be combined to form a high-level Petri net at a higher level of
abstraction. Although the low-level Petri nets being created by domain experts may lead
to some validity in their creation, it is not clear whether said domain experts are
experienced in creating Petri net models. Furthermore, there is no mention of validating
the high-level Petri net once it has been composed from the low-level Petri nets. A
proof-of-concept program was written to demonstrate the efficacy of their method, using
one of the case studies presented in the source [Chen, 2011].
Jasiul, Szpyrka, and Śliwa present a colored Petri net model called PRONTOnet,
which formally models malware and can detect the presence of malware in a computer
system from given behaviors. A log of suspicious events is generated from a hooking
engine, which is a piece of software that lets a person alter or augment the behavior of
other software by intercepting function calls, messages, or events passed between
software components, called PRONTOlogy, also developed by the authors of the source.
The log is passed into PRONTOnet for analysis. The verification process is divided into
a series of experiments to detect malware, using the Virut malware as a case study:
checking that Virut can be modeled as a colored Petri net model, acquiring both
legitimate and malicious event data from a computer system infected with Virut, and
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checking that the data gathered from the system can be passed to PRONTOnet and
compared with the model of Virut to see if the malware can be detected on the infected
system. The results of the experiment showed that the model was able to correctly detect
the presence of Virut, based on system behavior rather than more traditional signaturebased detection. However, while the authors were able to verify that the model worked
for the instance of the Virut malware, they did not test the model with other malware.
Furthermore, they were focusing on verifying that their method works for detecting
malware correctly rather than validating that the colored Petri net was a good model of
malware behavior [Jasiul, 2014].
Another research team, He and Fu, used high-level Petri nets created in the PIPE+
environment to model and analyze security design patterns, which include descriptions of
the structure and interactions of security assurance mechanisms to be written into
software. The authors explain that they did not have security domain experts assist with
creating the models, so several iterations had to be developed before the models were
deemed correct to the best of their knowledge by comparing them with the requirements
specifications. However, comparing a model to its specifications is part of verification,
not validation, because that answers the question of whether the model was built
correctly. The models themselves were defined with linear time temporal logic and
analyzed; however, this can only specify and analyze correctness properties of the
security design pattern models and not general security properties [He, 2016]. According
to He and Fu, the majority of the correctness properties analyzed were classified as
liveness properties, which according to the authors are very difficult to verify by using
model checking. Some of the models were infinite state models, which cannot be model
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checked without abstraction. Because of the difficulty of using model checking to
analyze the Petri nets, the authors turned to using simulation to find finite sequences to
analyze. This turns liveness analysis into reachability analysis, which is easier to
perform. The simulation showed that there is a transition firing sequence with an initial
marking that can satisfy the given correctness properties, but not that every transition
firing sequence satisfies the properties. [He, 2016].
While there are a variety of different methods used to check the Petri net and/or
cybersecurity models, they all fall under one of four categories: formal analysis,
comparison with another known valid model, comparison with data from the simuland, or
running and checking a simulation of the model. As Petri nets have a well-defined
mathematical structure, formal analysis techniques are shared between Petri net models
of different simulands. Comparing a Petri net or cybersecurity model with another
known valid model depends on the existence of the other model. Finally, running a
simulation of the model and then checking the results would require that the model itself
be tuned with some initial parameter values (if any exist), and several iterations of model
calibration may be required before the simulation could be deemed reliable for validation.
Although formal analysis of the Petri net properties would seem ideal, the surveyed
literature suggests that it is often merely a verification method and not validation. The
communications protocol model developed by Courtiat, Ayache, and Algayres was
claimed to be validated using Petri net formal properties. In their explanation, the formal
properties of Petri nets, such as boundedness and liveness, were used to indicate desired
properties of the protocol. Even though they called it validation, it is clearly verification
because they were concerned with the correctness of the model. On the other hand,
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formal analysis was used by Heiner and Koch in validating biochemical models. Their
technique involved assigning a biochemical interpretation to the t-invariants, which
represented basic system behavior, that were analyzed and then showing that there were
no t-invariants without a biochemical interpretation in the model. This could be
considered validation as the presence of t-invariants can be compared with the actual
biochemical activities in the simuland.
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5.0 RESEARCH FOCUS
5.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following research questions were defined.
1. What baseline data should be gathered about cyberattacks or cybersecurity for
validation?
2. What is the relationship, if any, between the formal properties of Petri nets and the
relevant cybersecurity simulands modeled by Petri nets?
a. Is formal analysis of Petri nets a verification or validation method for
cybersecurity simulands?
3. Which verification and validation methods are suitable for Petri net models of
cyberattacks?
a. Assuming that there are multiple methods of verification and validation for a
Petri net model, is using a single method sufficient, or should multiple
methods be used?
b. Are some validation methods more effective than others for validating Petri
net models of cybersecurity simulands?
5.2 RESEARCH TASKS
Each research question required a series of tasks. For research question 1, the
tasks were
1. Review lists of published cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
2. Generate a baseline for comparison with the model.
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For research question 2, the tasks were
1. Review literature for instances of verification and validation of Petri nets and
cybersecurity models.
2. Clearly distinguish between verification and validation.
3. Define validation for purposes of this thesis.
4. Learn how to perform formal analysis of Petri nets.
5. Ascertain how to interpret analysis in the context of the simuland.
6. Evaluate formal analysis as verification or validation method.
For research question 3, the tasks were
1. Review and categorize methods of validation for Petri net models.
2. Evaluate the efficacy of the use of one validation method versus multiple methods.
3. Apply the validation method(s) to a realistically sized Petri net model of a real
computer system, in this case Metasploitable.
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6.0 RESULTS AND FINDINGS
6.1 RESEARCH QUESTION ANSWERS
The first question to answer is what baseline data should be gathered for
validation. This question is answered by compiling a list of known vulnerabilities of the
computer system being modeled. This list provides a starting point for determining
which vulnerabilities should be modelled and which should not. Thus, the vulnerability
list is the baseline data to be validated against.
All Petri nets have inherent formal properties, no matter the simuland. In order to
determine a relationship between the formal properties of the Petri net and properties of
the simuland, one must assign a suitable interpretation of the formal properties in the
context of the simuland. The same Petri net component could be re-used for different
models with a different meaning in each model. Each individual model, though identical
in structure, would have a different interpretation of what its properties mean, depending
on the simuland. Furthermore, if the requirements specifications require certain formal
properties to hold, then showing that those properties are held is verification that the
model was created correctly.
If available, data collected previously from cyberattacks on specific computer
systems could be used to calibrate the Petri net model, and then a simulation could be
run. The simulation results can then be analyzed for further comparison. However,
without such data, at least two other methods are useful for validating Petri nets of
cyberattacks: comparison of Petri net details with natural language specification of
vulnerabilities and cyberattacks, such as attack pattern databases, vulnerability databases,
and vulnerability scan reports, and cause-effect graphing of the process used to create the
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Petri net. If the process for creating a Petri net model is shown to be valid, then there is a
higher probability that the resulting model will be valid, but this is not guaranteed.
Many of the validation methods mentioned in the literature were not fully
described or do not distinguish between verification and validation. Some methods were
found to be verification methods, for example comparing the model with the
requirements specifications of the system being modeled rather than comparing the
model with the simuland itself and cannot be considered effective validation methods.
6.2 METHODS TO ANSWERING RESEARCH QUESTIONS
6.2.1 VALIDATION ASSUMPTIONS
Before starting the validation process, it is important to set up certain assumptions
made about the model. The following assumptions were made:
1. The report from the OpenVAS vulnerability scanner is considered to be an accurate
list of known vulnerabilities in Metasploitable. This is not a claim that it is a
complete list of vulnerabilities as OpenVAS only knows about vulnerabilities found
in the database files it uses, which would not include zero-day vulnerabilities. Zeroday vulnerabilities are unknown to the vendor and as such, have not been reported
and fixed [Anonymous, 2016].
2. All places in the Petri net are considered to be Boolean states and thus only require
zero or one token. This assumption was agreed on by consensus of the research team
for ease of modeling.
3. The cyberattacks being modeled are independent of each other. If cyberattacks were
considered dependent on each other, then the created Petri nets will be highly coupled
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with each other, and thus be harder to create and validate. This assumption was
agreed on by consensus of the research team for ease of modeling.
4. Pre-conditions of a general attack will also hold for the specific sub-classes of that
general attack. The sub-classes of a type of attack are considered variants of that
attack and so would have the same pre-conditions.
5. All Petri nets model the attacker’s intrusion into a computer system, not the defender
defending from an attack, though there may be some elements of defense in the
model, i.e., the attacker has to overcome a firewall. This assumption was agreed on
by consensus of the research team for ease of modeling.
6. Denial-of-service attacks are not modeled. Denial-of-service attacks have a different
goal than the other types of attacks, so they were omitted. Specifically, the goal of
most attacks is to gain access to a system or its data, so crashing the system would
constitute a failure of that goal. A denial-of-service, on the other hand, has a goal to
crash or otherwise throttle the system, which is an opposing goal and does not fit into
the structure of the model.
6.3 VALIDATION METHODS
6.3.1 BASELINE DATA GATHERING
In order to answer research question 1 that asks what baseline data on
cyberattacks or cybersecurity should be gathered for validation, it was determined that
the target computer system’s vulnerabilities must be known. To facilitate this process,
the intentionally vulnerable Linux virtual machine, Metasploitable, was chosen as the
target computer system. Metasploitable is commonly used in the cybersecurity industry
to practice penetration testing techniques [Anonymous, 2017]. A copy of Metasploitable
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was downloaded and installed, using Oracle’s virtual machine manager VirtualBox. A
copy of Kali Linux, which is a Linux distribution dedicated to penetration testing and
comes with a suite of security tools that can launch cyberattacks, was also installed on the
computer.
In order to obtain a list of vulnerabilities from Metasploitable, the open source
vulnerability scanner OpenVAS was chosen and installed on Kali Linux. Both the
Metasploitable and Kali Linux virtual machines were launched on the same host-only
network so that OpenVAS could scan Metasploitable without exposing Metasploitable to
the outside network. The results of the vulnerability scan are summarized in the
appendix. In summary, OpenVAS found 59 different vulnerabilities from the CAPEC
and CVE vulnerability databases in Metasploitable.
The MITRE Corporation manages a database of cyberattack patterns, descriptions
of common methods for exploiting software, known as Common Attack Pattern
Enumeration and Classification, or CAPEC for short, which provides an extensive,
though not complete, list of known attacks patterns [MITRE, 2017]. Each CAPEC entry
describes a specific kind of cyberattack an attacker might use. CAPEC was chosen
because several entries (though not all) are described in enough detail, including attack
prerequisites and attack steps, such that they can be converted from natural language to
Petri net models.
Each vulnerability that OpenVAS reported was read in detail to find keywords
that could be searched for in the CAPEC database to find a relevant CAPEC entry. For
instance, there were multiple vulnerabilities to brute force attacks on passwords, so these
vulnerabilities could be associated with CAPEC entry 49, “Password Brute Forcing.”
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The appendix has the relevant table with vulnerabilities and any associated CAPEC
entries found for the vulnerability listed. Not all vulnerabilities had a relevant CAPEC
entry, either because the type of vulnerability was not listed in CAPEC or it was reported
as generic “multiple security vulnerabilities” (see appendix).
6.3.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PETRI NET PROPERTIES AND SIMULAND
To answer research question 2 that asks about the relationship between formal
properties of Petri nets and properties of the cybersecurity simuland, invariant analysis
was performed on the Petri nets. For this research, the presence or absence of the
invariant properties (t-invariant and p-invariant) gives no indication to the validity or lack
thereof of the Petri net. The Petri nets that are being constructed for this research involve
a start-to-finish flow, where the attacker starts his or her attack and proceeds through
until he or she either successfully achieves the goal or fails to achieve the goal because
the attack was detected and blocked. The only loops that would indicate the presence of
a t-invariant are those put in to model an attacker trying different types of attacks to
achieve the same goal. See Figure 12 on the next page for an example of this in a Petri
net of CAPEC entry 63 “Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).” If the place corresponding to the
state “Survey for user-controllable inputs: Indicators” activates the transition “Survey for
user-controllable inputs: Indicator-Inconclusive,” then it will loop back to the state
“Survey the application for user-controllable inputs,” where the attacker will be able to
choose another method to get the indicators of user-controllable inputs.
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Figure 12: This Petri net has a t-invariant because if the state showing that the
indicators of user-controllable inputs are known to the attacker and the attacker
determines that the indicators are inconclusive, then the Petri net will go back to the state
of application surveyed for user-controllable inputs. This is a loop which is what a tinvariant represents in the net. Petri net was created in PIPE v4.3.0 using information
from CAPEC entry 63.
Petri nets are structured in this research so that places are considered states in
which a token indicates that the state is true and no token indicates that the state is false.
Some transitions may add a token back into the previous place to indicate that the state
did not change after the transition fired. Thus, for every transition firing, at least one
additional token will be created, which breaks the conservation of tokens; therefore, there
are no p-invariants in the Petri nets used in this research. Invariant analysis, which has
been used for validating Petri nets of biological systems, as seen in [Heiner, 2004a],
[Heiner, 2004b], [Low, 2009], and [Hardy, 2008], is therefore not a useful method of
analysis for validating the Petri nets of computer system vulnerabilities and cyberattacks
created in this research.
Furthermore, because each place is considered a state, only one token per place is
required to indicate that the state is true. A Petri net that has a maximum of only one
token per place is known as a 1-bounded or safe Petri net, which satisfies the
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boundedness property. However, this boundedness does not say anything about the
validity of the Petri net, only that if the Petri net had more than one token in any single
place, it is incorrect, which is an indication that the Petri net may not be made correctly;
this is a verification problem and not a validation problem.
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6.3.3 VALIDATION METHODS SUITABLE FOR PETRI NET MODELS OF
CYBERSECURITY SIMULANDS
Because the process for converting CAPEC entries to Petri net models is known,
the Petri nets can be validated by comparing the model and its information with the
information in the CAPEC entry. This can be done in one of two ways, either through
face validation, comparing the model to the CAPEC entry manually, or via a cause-effect
graph. While face validation is an informal method, it can be used as a preliminary check
to make sure no obvious errors are in the model when it is created. Cause-effect
graphing, in particular the cause-effect net variant as presented by Desel, et al., can be
used to check the CAPEC entry to Petri net model process. Specifically, the generation
of the cause-effect net uses a manual process to convert the natural language specification
(in this research’s case, the CAPEC entry) to the Petri net. If the process of converting
CAPEC entries to Petri nets can be validated, then there is a higher chance that the
resulting Petri net will be valid, though this is not guaranteed, so the resulting Petri net
will also need to be validated itself. This partially answers a sub-question of research
question 3 that asks about using multiple methods of validation versus using a single
method of validation.
Research question 3 asks about suitable validation methods for Petri nets of
cybersecurity, one such method is a dynamic validation method for Petri net modeling of
cyberattacks by attempting to actually launch the attack on a real computer system using
the Petri net as a guide. If the attack is successful, then at the very least, the path to the
success state will be considered valid. To illustrate this method, a Petri net model of the
Ingreslock backdoor exploit was created, as seen in Figure 13 on the next page, and then
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an attempt to use the exploit was conducted on a Kali Linux virtual machine and a
Metasploitable virtual machine running in VirtualBox.

Figure 13: The Ingreslock backdoor exploit.
Note that this Petri net does not have a specific CAPEC entry as all CAPEC entries for
backdoor-based attacks involve installing a backdoor into a software system while the
software is being developed. All CAPEC entries for backdoor-based attacks do not
consider installing a backdoor program, such as Ingreslock, into an already finished and
deployed software system.
The steps for following the Ingreslock backdoor exploit are very simple: 1) the
attacker conducts a port scan to find the port Ingreslock is running on, and 2) the attacker
attempts to use a remote access program to gain access to the target system. The
following screenshots are of a terminal window in Kali Linux with the relevant
command-line programs, Nmap, a network mapper program that can perform port
scanning, and Netcat, a program for remote access, used to launch the attack modeled in
Figure 13 upon a Metasploitable target, using only the Petri net as a guide. All
commands used to exploit the Ingreslock backdoor are built into the Kali Linux
distribution.
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Figure 14: Port scan results from Nmap scan.
The first step is to run a port scan of the target system to find the port Ingreslock
is running on. As seen in the screenshot above (Figure 14), Ingreslock is found running
on TCP port 1524. This corresponds to the transition “attack scans port,” place “scan
complete,” transition “attacker sees ingreslock,” and place “ingreslock port known to
attacker.” The next step is to attempt to use netcat, a remote access program built into
Kali Linux, on the target, using the target’s IP address and port number of Ingreslock as
arguments.
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Figure 15: Netcat command with IP address of target and port number of Ingreslock as
arguments.
In Figure 14 above, the Netcat command, nc, is typed in with the Metasploitable
target IP of 192.168.56.101 and port number 1524 as arguments. This corresponds to the
transition “attempt to gain access with netcat,” and place “access attempt complete.”
Because Kali Linux has the netcat program installed, the pre-condition place of “attacker
able run netcat” is considered true and marked with a token, which together, along with
the preceding place “ingreslock port known to attacker” being marked, will enable the
transition “attempt to gain access with netcat.”
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Figure 16: Root access to the Metasploitable target has been achieved.
Once Netcat executes, the attacker now has root access to the Metasploitable
target, as seen in Figure 16 above. The attack has been a success. The command whoami
reports root and the command ifconfig reports the IP address of the system running the
command as 192.168.56.101, which is the IP address of the Metasploitable target. This
corresponds to using transition “attempt succeeds” and then marking the final place
“attacker has root access,” which is the success state.
Because the attack on an actual computer system running Metasploitable was
completed successfully, fully following the steps represented in the Petri net model in
Figure 13, the model appears to be valid, at least for the firing sequence leading to the
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success state. There are two failure states in the Petri net depicted in Figure 13; one is
reached from the place “scan complete” going with transition “attacker misses
ingreslock.” This would mean that the port scan, using Nmap or some other port scan
program, did not detect Ingreslock running on port 1524, possibly because the scanner
was set to a faster speed, which is known to skip ports. The other failure state is reached
from place “access attempt complete” going with the transition “attempt fails.” This
might occur if the Metasploitable target crashed from netcat attempting to establish a
connection. Metasploitable is a very unstable operating system because of its large
number of inherent vulnerabilities. A simple port scan may cause Metasploitable to crash
soon after reporting the results to the attacker. However, these two failure conditions
have not been validated as Metasploitable remained running throughout the experiment.
Consequently, in this experiment, there was partial validation of the Petri net model in
Figure 13.
The Petri net in Figure 17 on the next three pages is the Petri net created of
CAPEC entry 63, cross-site scripting, by Tymaine Whitaker. It is split into sections that
represent the various stages of the attack, from the exploration stage to the successful or
unsuccessful delivery of the malicious JavaScript payload. Cross-site scripting is a type
of attack that allows an attacker to gain control over a computer system through an
Internet browser by having the user unknowingly execute a malicious script embedded in
the webpage or URL. A webserver with a malicious JavaScript code embedded in the
main page was set up on Kali Linux. Figure 18 on page 65 highlights the script that was
generated using the Browser Exploitation Framework Project, or BeEF for short, which is
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a security tool built into Kali Linux for testing Internet browser attack vectors, and
embedded into the main HTML page of the webserver.

(a)

(b)

65

(c)

(d)
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(e)
Figure 17: The Petri net for CAPEC-63, Cross-Site Scripting, broken into sections
representing the different stages of the attack. This Petri net was created in PIPE v4.3.0.
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Figure 18: The index.html file for the main Apache2 webserver was edited to include the
hook script generated by BeEF that would be executed on any browser that visited the
website.
Figure 18 above highlights the embedded script that was generated by BeEF to
automatically hook any browser that visits the website into the BeEF control panel where
commands can be sent. The hooking of a browser is represented by the firing of the
transition labeled “Use a browser” in Figure 17(a) as a browser was used instead of a
spidering tool or proxy tool. However, already this method is failing to properly validate
the model as the webserver being used in the example does not have any usercontrollable inputs, which is what the explore phase is looking for.

68

Figure 19: Instance of Firefox connected to the webserver on Kali Linux that has
the malicious hook script embedded in the front page.
Figure 19 above shows the default page of the webserver as visited with Firefox
on Metasploitable, after having started a GUI shell using the startx command. Note that
there is nothing out of the ordinary is seen on the page. There is no indication that a
script was run in the background. Because Metasploitable is intentionally vulnerable,
there are no script blockers installed in the copy of Firefox being run, and so the
transition “Security controls do not block access to potential entry points” in Figure 17(b)
is fired. This transition would be considered controlled by the defender in a PNP, rather
than the attacker.
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Figure 20: The BeEF interface on Kali Linux. Note how the Metasploitable target,
192.168.56.101, has been added to the list of hooked browsers on the left.
Figure 20 above is the control panel for the BeEF framework. On the left side is a
list of browsers hooked into BeEF. The IP address 192.168.56.101 is the address of the
Metasploitable VM and it has connected to the webserver running on Kali Linux with IP
address 192.168.56.102. This section does not actually correspond to any place or
transition in the Petri net, but rather it illustrates what the BeEF interface looks like once
Metasploitable’s browser is hooked into it.
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Figure 21: The list of exploits that can be used by sending commands to the hooked
browser.
Figure 21 above shows the list of commands that can be sent to the hooked
browser to send malicious commands from BeEF. This list corresponds to the transition
“Use a list: UI” since a user interface list is provided for the various exploits that can be
executed on the hooked browser. These commands could be used to take control of the
target browser or, even more dangerously, take control of the machine via a rooted shell.
However, attempting these commands did not appear to work in the experimental set up.
So the Petri net could not be validated further. In fact, it cannot be claimed that the entire
Petri net was validated in this manner, only that certain places and transitions are
accurate.
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Figures 18 to 21 demonstrate a cross-site scripting attack performed by hooking a
browser visiting a malicious webserver. This is not, however, a good example of the
attack demonstrated in the Petri net in Figure 17. Figures 22 to 27 shows another crosssite scripting attack performed on the vulnerable Mutillidae database that comes preinstalled on Metasploitable.

(a)

(b)
Figure 22: Changing the database name in the configuration file from “metasploit” in (a)
to “owasp10” in (b).

72

In Figure 22 on the previous page, the name of the database was changed from
“metasploit” to “owasp10.” This was necessary before the cross-site scripting attack
could be executed, as the example attack being performed is considered one of the Open
Web Application Security Project, OWASP, top ten vulnerabilities in web servers.
Figure 23 below is a screenshot showing that the database has been reset to apply the
changes made in the configuration file.

Figure 23: Resetting the database to apply the changed database name.
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Figure 24: Application is found to have user-controllable inputs and a sample script was
inserted to be executed.
Figure 24 above shows that the web application, Mutillidae, has been
surveyed for user-controllable inputs using a browser, which corresponds to the transition
“Use a browser” being fired and then transition “Determine the indicators are positive”
has been fired after place “Indicators of user-controllable inputs” is marked. The security
is turned off (in Figure 25 above it is set to “0 (Hosed)”), so the transition “Security
controls ignore or don’t block surveying” is fired instead of the security controls blocking
the survey attempt. In this example, a basic blog entry is able to be anonymously created
and posted. Furthermore, the attacker uses external resources to come up with a sample
script to be inserted into the blog post that will be executed once the blog entry is saved
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as seen in Figure 25 below. Thus from the place “Attacker has potential entry-points for
the web application” the transition labeled “Use a list: resources” is enabled and fired.
Again, because the security is turned off, the transition “Security controls do not block
access to potential entry points” is then fired.

Figure 25: Execution of the script inserted into the user-controlled input field.
The execution of the script as seen in Figure 25 above could be considered an
example of content spoofing, in that the script raises a spoofed pop-up alert to the user.
So the transition “Attacker attempts Content Spoofing” is fired while typing in the simple
script seen in Figure 24 corresponds to the place “Attacker prepares JavaScript to spoof
content” and the firing of transition “Develop malicious JavaScript and expose attackermodified invalid information.” This simple script is not actually malicious and is only
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used to demonstrate how an attacker could potentially write a more malicious script in
this same blog post entry form and then execute it. Once more, because the security
controls are turned off for Mutillidae, the transition “Security controls do not block
JavaScript used to spoof content” is fired and leads to the final place “Attacker succeeds
in spoofing content.”
This is not a full validation of the entire Petri net, rather the pop-up shows that the
content spoofing outcome of the Petri net from the start to end was able to be performed
on the Metasploitable web server. However, the process remains largely the same until
the split in the exploit stage, which contains the only significant difference. As such, the
Petri net is partially validated. To fully validate the Petri net, more complex scripts
would need to be developed to attempt a forceful browsing or to steal credentials or page
content from the web server to check the other two paths in the net.
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The Petri net in Figure 26 below and on the next page is the Petri net created of
CAPEC entry 66, SQL Injection, by Tymaine Whitaker. Much like the Petri net in
Figure 17, Figure 22 is split into sections for each stage of the attack. SQL injection is a
type of attack where the attacker attempts to use malicious SQL commands in a userinput text field to obtain information stored in the underlying SQL database.

(a)
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(b)

(c)
Figure 26: The Petri net of CAPEC-66, SQL Injection, created by Tymaine Whitaker in
PIPE v4.3.0. It is segmented into the three stages of the attack: (a) explore, (b)
experiment, (c) exploit.
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The first step of the SQL injection attack is to explore the website searching for
all available links or sniff network traffic to find where input data would be entered. For
this simple SQL injection example, there was a section of the Metasploitable-hosted web
application known as Damn Vulnerable Web Application, or DVWA for short, dedicated
to testing SQL injection queries as shown in Figure 27 below.

Figure 27: The SQL injection section of the DVWA hosted on Metasploitable.
This web application has an input form for User ID, thus the transition “Attacker
identifies data input” is fired proceeding to place “At least one data input to application
identified.” Then the next transition labeled “Attacker determines user-controllable input
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susceptible to injection” is enabled. Because DVWA is a known vulnerable web
application, this transition is fired to reach place “Experiment phase of the attack.”

Figure 28: Initial SQL injection attempt.
Figure 28 shows the initial attempt to perform an SQL injection by using a logical
OR with an always true statement ‘0’=’0’, but written in such a way to have the server
raise an error message. In this example, the error message tells the attacker that the
server is running MySQL, as seen in Figure 29 on the next page.
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Figure 29: Error message from the SQL injection attempt in Figure 28. Note that it
specifies MySQL and a hint showing that the syntax around ‘0’ is incorrect.
An attacker can use this error message to narrow down the potential SQL server
types to MySQL and thus tailor his queries to be specific to MySQL databases. This
corresponds to the transition “Attacker receives an error message from the server
indicating that there was a problem with the SQL query,” at which point the attacker will
begin to attempt to exploit the vulnerability, firing transition “Attacker tries to exploit
SQL Injection vulnerability” and reaching the place “Experiment and Exploit phase.”
From here the attacker uses a public resource to add logic to the injected query, thus
firing transition “Atacker [sic] uses public resources such as “SQL Injection Cheat
Sheet”.” The following Figures 30 to 34 all show examples of various query logic to
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gather potentially sensitive information from the database, ending in usernames and
password hashes. These Figures are all part of the place labeled “SQL injection occuring
[sic]” in the Petri net in Figure 26(c).

Figure 30: Attacker uses a “union select null, version() #” appended to the query to gather
information on the MySQL server version.
Figure 30 above shows that the attacker is using logic appended to the initial
injection query to search for information about the server. In this case, the attacker finds
that the version of MySQL being run is “5.0.51a-3ubuntu5” as seen in the surname field
of the last entry.
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Figure 31: Attacker uses a “union select null, database() #” appended to the query to
obtain the name of the underlying database.
Figure 31 above shows that the attacker is using more logic appended to the initial
injection query to search for information about the database. In this case, the attacker
finds that the database is called “dvwa” as seen in the surname field of the last entry.
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Figure 32: Attacker uses a “union select null, table_name from
information_schema.tables #” appended to the query to obtain the names of the tables in
the information schema of the database.
Figure 32 above demonstrates more logic used by the attacker to find out the
names of tables in the database from the information schema, which describes how a
database is organized.
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Figure 33: Attacker uses a “union select null, table_name from
information_schema.tables where table_name = user #” appended to the query to obtain
the names of the tables starting with user in the information schema of the database.
Figure 33 above shows that the attacker is using more logic to narrow down his
search to just the tables that start with “user,” to find the table where the usernames and
password hashes are possibly stored. If the attacker has knowledge of MySQL databases,
then he would know that the table labeled “users” has the information he seeks. Thus he
will be able to use logic on the users table to try and output the usernames and password
hashes to the screen.
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Figure 34: The attacker appends “union select null, concat(first_name , 0x0a, last_name,
0x0a, user, 0x0a, password) from users #” to obtain usernames and password hashes.
Finally the attacker is able to use logic on the users able in the database to obtain
a list of usernames and the password hash associated with each username. At this point
the attacker has achieved the goal of obtaining usernames and password hashes, so the
transition labeled “Attacker achieves goal of unauthorized system access, denial of
service, etc.” fires and the place “Attacker has unauthorized system access, denial of
service, etc.” is marked, indicating a successful exploitation of the database. Thus, this
dynamic validation method for the Petri net of CAPEC-66 has been able to show that the
Petri net has been validated for the specific attacks chosen to exploit the database. No
attempt was made to cause the injection to fail, though this could be achieved by setting
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the security level on the vulnerable webserver to high instead of low. Doing this will
cause the server to not give an error message if an incorrect SQL query is attempted,
which may stop some attackers, though a determined attacker may not stop at that point
and continue on.
6.3.4 GENERALIZED PROCEDURE FOR DYNAMIC VALIDATION
CAPEC entries are generally listed in three stages: explore, experiment, or
exploit. However, not all entries have all three stages. Based on the three dynamic
validation method examples above, a general procedure for the dynamic validation of
Petri nets can be summarized as the following:
1. Start the explore stage, if any, by determining what information the attacker would
have at the start, such as knowledge of the system being attacked from an earlier
attack or scan. This would be the initial place(s) after preconditions are met.
a. If the first stage has multiple transitions for different types of attacks, then
pick one attack to perform to continue to the next stage.
b. Otherwise, perform the action represented by the first transition.
c. If there is no explore stage, then begin with whichever transition occurs first
in the net after the preconditions.
2. Each time a transition is fired, compare the resulting state of the Petri net with the
state of the simuland after performing the action associated with the transition. This
is the validation by comparing the current marking of the Petri net with the state of
the simuland.
a. Some actions taken on the simuland may cause the Petri net to progress
through a short firing sequence, skipping intermediate steps. These
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intermediate steps may be controlled by the defender, such as security controls
blocking an attack attempt, and thus not able to be performed in the test
attack.
b. If the attack was blocked or otherwise unsuccessful, then progress to a failure
place. While this does not validate the success path, it does validate the part
of the model where the attack fails.
3. Continue progressing through the attack steps in the next stage (explore, experiment,
or exploit) of the attack.
a. Whenever there is a branch with multiple transitions, select the action that
corresponds to the attack vector being used.
b. If the attack is able to be performed successfully and the Petri net marking
indicates a successful attack at the end, then the specific firing sequence used
to achieve the success state is validated.
In a validation comparison of a successful attack, both the attack steps performed
and the Petri net firing sequence that leads to the success state should match. For
complete validation of the Petri net, this comparison should be performed for every
possible firing sequence.
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6.4 DISCUSSION
As part of a larger research project, the validation of Petri net cyberattack models
is an essential step before the simulation and interpretation of the results can be
performed. The composed Petri net models of computer vulnerabilities need to correctly
represent the computer system’s vulnerabilities. In reference to research question 1 about
gathering baseline data for validation, the OpenVAS vulnerability scanner was used to
gather a list of known vulnerabilities in a Metasploitable target. This list was then crosschecked with MITRE’s CAPEC database to come up with a selection of CAPEC entries
to be modeled as Petri nets.
Considering research question 3 about validation methods for Petri nets, the
sources surveyed do not present a single, clear validation method for Petri nets of
cybersecurity simulands or other simulands. Some sources, such as [Chen, 2011] and
[Jasiul, 2014], simply mentioned validation in passing and moved on, with little to no
detail of how the validation process was performed and instead, focused on verification
of the model. Other sources, such as [Heiner, 2004a], [Heiner, 2004b], [Low, 2009], and
[Hardy, 2008], claim to use formal analysis, via t-invariants and/or p-invariants, to
validate the model even though formal analysis lends itself more to verification of the
model.
Nonetheless, at least four main categories of Petri net validation methods have
been identified throughout the literature survey: formal analysis, model comparison with
the simuland, model comparison with other validated models, and validation through
simulation. There could still be some question about whether formal analysis of Petri net
models is actually a validation or a verification method. However, there are several
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different types of formal analysis of Petri nets, ranging from invariant analysis to
reachability analysis, so it is possible that at least one of the analysis methods may lend
itself to validation of the model in addition to verification. Model comparison would
present a greater challenge as it requires existing models of cyber vulnerabilities against
which the Petri net models being created in this research project could be compared.
Validation by simulation is possible with the use of Petri net simulation tools, such as the
Platform Independent Petri net Editor (PIPE) software, to create and run the Petri net
models [Dingle, 2009]. The method of validation may vary for models of different
simulands.
Regarding sub-question a of research question 3 about the use of multiple
validation methods versus a single validation method as discussed in section 6.3.3, causeeffect graphing is a validation method that can be applied to the process of creating the
Petri net. However, the Petri net model itself must then be validated with another
method. A dynamic validation method is to launch a cyberattack upon an actual
computer system using the Petri net model as a guide. If the attack is successful, then the
Petri net can be partially validated as discussed in the latter portion of section 6.3.3.
However, this can only be done if the Petri net provides enough details to conduct the
attack, as some attack patterns are too generic to be validated with this method, as seen in
the first CAPEC-63 example. CAPEC-63 also assumes that the website with the script
running will have user-controlled inputs, which is not the case with the Apache2
webserver set up in Kali Linux. The second CAPEC-63 example, however, was able to
show that the Petri net could be used as a guide to help launch a cross-site scripting attack
upon a vulnerable webserver running on Metasploitable.
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Research question 2, whether or not formal analysis of Petri net properties is a
validation method, was partially answered. The Petri nets created for this research did
not exhibit useful information when formally analyzed for potential validation purposes.
All nets were created to be 1-bounded, so a simple check that the net was indeed 1bounded would be an indicator that the Petri net was created correctly, which is
considered verification. The invariant properties were not consistent because only some
of the Petri nets created for this research had t-invariants. None of the Petri nets created
had p-invariants as the total number of tokens within any given sub-set of the net would
not remain constant because of how some enabled transitions deposit tokens back into the
enabling place to keep the state as true, thus adding more tokens into the Petri net over
time. In order for this analysis to be a validation method, it must be compared with the
simuland or another model. Unlike the research presented in [Heiner, 2004a] and
[Heiner, 2004b], which defined biochemical interpretations for t-invariants, no suitable
interpretations of what t-invariants or p-invariants actually mean in the context of
cyberattacks upon a computer system could be defined for this research project. Without
a suitable interpretation, invariant analysis merely shows the presence or absence of
certain loop (for t-invariants) or conservation (for p-invariants) properties of the Petri net
and does not indicate anything more than that. Therefore, for the Petri nets created for
this research, analysis of the Petri net properties of boundedness and invariants is not a
validation method, but is instead a verification method.
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7.0 FUTURE WORKS
The main validation methods mentioned in this thesis, comparison of Petri net
with CAPEC entries and cause-effect graphing, have been applied only to Petri net
components. This research project, however, also involves fully developing a model of
Metasploitable from these components. This has not yet been achieved as of this thesis
paper as Petri net components from CAPEC entries are still being constructed; those will
eventually be composed into a model of Metasploitable’s vulnerabilities. Further study
will be needed to validate the composite model once it has been put together. Regression
analysis should be used here, as the composition of valid models is not necessarily valid
by default [Wesiel, 2003] [Petty, 2005]. According to Heiner and Koch in their paper on
validating Petri net models of systems biology, “Thus, a first and very evident question
concerning a model of increasing size is the one, whether all the formal basic behaviour
of the smaller pieces, i.e. model components, are still maintained in the larger model, and
that there are no unwanted additional ones.”
If future Petri net models of cyberattacks upon computer systems do end up with
the presence of t-invariants or p-invariants, it will be useful to assign a suitable
interpretation to those invariants to be able to use the model as a way to learn about the
modelled cyberattack. For purposes of validation, if there is a well-defined interpretation
of invariant properties, then showing the presence of said invariants would be a validation
method if it can be shown that the invariants also exist in the simuland.
An experiment that could be done would be to perform a comparison of two or
more validation methods on Petri net models of Metasploitable. The Petri net models
should be deliberately created with discrepancies. As each of the chosen validation
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methods is applied, various data can be obtained, answering the questions: how many of
the deliberately introduced errors each validation method found, how many other nondeliberate errors each validation method found, how much effort was required to use the
validation method, and how much data (other than the Petri net model itself) were needed
to apply the validation method. This would give some insight into which validation
method is more suitable.
From the literature surveyed, there is very little published research on the
validation of Petri net modeling for cyberattacks. As more research is published, more
data would become available to calibrate future models. Furthermore, if future models of
cyberattacks were to be developed and properly validated, one more type of validation
would be to compare a new, not yet validated, model against the validated model.
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APPENDIX
METASPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES WITH CVE AND CAPEC ENTRIES

All vulnerabilities were found using OpenVAS installed on Kali Linux and
scanning Metasploitable. Associated CVEs and CAPEC entries were found by looking
for keywords in the OpenVAS report and searching the CAPEC and CVE databases for
those keywords.
Table 2: Metasploitable vulnerabilities with associated CVEs and CAPEC entries.
Vulnerability
NVT: Possible Backdoor: Ingreslock
NVT: Check for rexecd Service
NVT: DistCC Detection
NVT: SSH Brute Force Logins with default
Credentials Reporting
NVT: X Server
NVT: OS End Of Life Detection

Associated CVE
none
CVE-1999-0618
none
none

NVT: TWiki XSS and Command Execution
Vulnerabilities
NVT: phpMyAdmin Code Injection and XSS
Vulnerability
NVT: phpMyAdmin BLOB Streaming Multiple
Input Validation Vulnerabilities
NVT: phpMyAdmin Configuration File PHP Code
Injection Vulnerability
NVT: Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware 4.2 Multiple
Unspecified Vulnerabilities

CVE-2008-5304
CVE-2008-5303
CVE-2009-1151

NVT: PHP-CGI-based setups vulnerability when
parsing query string parameters from php files

NVT: Test HTTP dangerous methods
NVT: phpinfo() output accessible

CVE-1999-0526
none

Associated CAPEC
none1
none
none
CAPEC-49
CAPEC-70
none
CAPEC-313
CAPEC-312
CAPEC-63
CAPEC-63

none

CAPEC-153

CVE-2009-1285

CAPEC-242
CAPEC-176
none

CVE-2010-1135
CVE-2010-1134
CVE-2010-1133
CVE-2010-1136
CVE-2012-1823
CVE-2012-2311
CVE-2012-2336
CVE-2012-2335
none
none

none

CAPEC-274
none

1

All backdoor entries in CAPEC are for inserting malicious code (such as a backdoor)
during software development, not installing a backdoor after the fact.
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NVT: vsftpd Compromised Source Packages
Backdoor Vulnerability
NVT: Distributed Ruby (dRuby/DRb) Multiple
Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities
NVT: PostgreSQL weak password

none

CAPEC-443

none

CAPEC-253

none

NVT: PostgreSQL Multiple Security
Vulnerabilities

CVE-2010-1169
CVE-2010-1170
CVE-2010-1447
none

CAPEC-49
CAPEC-70
none

NVT: MySQL weak password
NVT: SSH Weak Encryption Algorithms
Supported
NVT: Multiple Vendors STARTTLS
Implementation Plaintext Arbitrary Command
Injection Vulnerability

NVT: Check if Mailserver answer to VRFY and
EXPN requests
NVT: SSL/TLS: Deprecated SSLv2 and SSLv3
Protocol Detection
NVT: SSL/TLS: SSLv3 Protocol CBC Cipher
Suites Information Disclosure Vulnerability
(POODLE)
NVT: SSL/TLS: RSA Temporary Key Handling
'RSA EXPORT' Downgrade Issue (FREAK)
NVT: SSL/TLS: 'DHE EXPORT' Man in the
Middle Security Bypass Vulnerability (LogJam)
NVT: SSL/TLS: Certificate Signed Using A Weak
Signature Algorithm
NVT: SSL/TLS: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Insufficient DH Group Strength Vulnerability
NVT: TWiki Cross-Site Request Forgery
Vulnerability - Sep10
NVT: phpMyAdmin Bookmark Security Bypass
Vulnerability
NVT: TWiki Cross-Site Request Forgery
Vulnerability
NVT: http TRACE XSS attack
NVT: /doc directory browsable
NVT: awiki Multiple Local File Include
Vulnerabilities
NVT: Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware 'fixedURLData'
Local File Inclusion Vulnerability
NVT: Tiki Wiki CMS Groupware Input Sanitation
Weakness Vulnerability

none

CAPEC-49
CAPEC-70
CAPEC-20

CVE-2011-0411
CVE-2011-1430
CVE-2011-1431
CVE-2011-1432
CVE-2011-1575
CVE-2011-1926
CVE-2011-2165
none

CAPEC-217
CAPEC-242

none

CAPEC-217
CAPEC-94
CAPEC-217
CAPEC-94

CVE-2014-3566

none

CVE-2015-0204

CAPEC-620

CVE-2015-4000

CVE-2009-4898

CAPEC-620
CAPEC-94
CAPEC-20
CAPEC-97
CAPEC-20
CAPEC-97
CAPEC-62

CVE-2011-0987

CAPEC-153

CVE-2009-1339

CAPEC-62

CVE-2004-2320
CVE-2003-1567
CVE-1999-0678
none

CAPEC-107

CVE-2016-10143

CAPEC-251

CVE-2008-5318
CVE-2008-5319

none

none
none

CAPEC-87
none
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NVT: phpMyAdmin Unspecified SQL Injection
and Cross Site Scripting Vulnerabilities
NVT: phpMyAdmin Multiple Cross Site Scripting
Vulnerabilities
NVT: phpMyAdmin Debug Backtrace Cross Site
Scripting Vulnerability
NVT: phpMyAdmin Database Search Cross Site
Scripting Vulnerability
NVT: phpMyAdmin SQL bookmark XSS
Vulnerability
NVT: phpMyAdmin Setup Script Request Cross
Site Scripting Vulnerability
NVT: phpMyAdmin 'error.php' Cross Site
Scripting Vulnerability
NVT: Apache HTTP Server 'httpOnly' Cookie
Information Disclosure Vulnerability
NVT: Check for Anonymous FTP Login
NVT: PostgreSQL Multiple Security
Vulnerabilities
NVT: OpenSSL CCS Man in the Middle Security
Bypass Vulnerability
NVT: PostgreSQL NULL Character CA SSL
Certificate Validation Security Bypass
Vulnerability
NVT: PostgreSQL 'bitsubstr' Buffer Overflow
Vulnerability
NVT: PostgreSQL 'intarray' Module 'gettoken()'
Buffer Over ow Vulnerability
NVT: PostgreSQL PL/Perl and PL/Tcl Local
Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
NVT: PostgreSQL 'RESET ALL' Unauthorized
Access Vulnerability
NVT: SSL/TLS: Certificate Expired
NVT: SSL/TLS: Report Weak Cipher Suites
NVT: PostgreSQL Conversion Encoding Remote
Denial of Service Vulnerability
NVT: MySQL Denial Of Service and Spoofing
Vulnerabilities
NVT: SSH Weak MAC Algorithms Supported
NVT: PostgreSQL Hash Table Integer Overflow
Vulnerability
NVT: PostgreSQL Low Cost Function Information
Disclosure Vulnerability

CVE-2009-3696
CVE-2010-3056

CAPEC-66
CAPEC-63
CAPEC-63

CVE-2010-2958

CAPEC-63

CVE-2010-4329

CAPEC-63

CVE-2009-2284
CVE-2010-3263

CAPEC-63
CAPEC-153
CAPEC-63

CVE-2010-4480

CAPEC-63

CVE-2012-0053

CAPEC-31

CVE-1999-0497
CVE-2009-3229
CVE-2009-3230
CVE-2009-3231
CVE-2014-0224

CAPEC-21
none

CVE-2009-4034
CVE-2009-4136

CAPEC-475
CAPEC-459

CVE-2010-0442

CAPEC-8

CVE-2010-4015

CAPEC-8

CVE-2010-3433
CVE-2010-1975

CAPEC-233
CAPEC-234
CAPEC-66

none
CVE-2013-2566
CVE-2015-4000
CVE-2009-0922

none
CAPEC-20
CAPEC-97
CAPEC-267

CVE-2009-4019
CVE-2009-4028
none

CAPEC-66
CAPEC-475
CAPEC-97
CAPEC-20
CAPEC-100
CAPEC-8
CAPEC-66

CVE-2010-0733
none

CAPEC-94
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The following table summarizes each unique CAPEC entry found as well as total
number of instances for each CAPEC entry from the OpenVAS scan summary above.
Table 3: All unique CAPEC entries with number of instances for each found in Table 2.
CAPEC Entry
CAPEC-63: Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing
CAPEC-217: Exploiting Incorrectly Configured SSL
CAPEC-49: Password Brute Forcing
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
CAPEC-70: Try Common(default) Usernames and Passwords
CAPEC-8: Buffer Overflow in an API Call
CAPEC-94: Man in the Middle Attack
CAPEC-153: Input Data Manipulation
CAPEC-242: Code Injection
CAPEC-475: Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
CAPEC-620: Drop Encryption Level
CAPEC-97: Cryptanalysis
CAPEC-100: Overflow Buffers
CAPEC-107: Cross Site Tracing
CAPEC-176: Configuration/Environment Manipulation
CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Trusted Credentials
CAPEC-233: Privilege Escalation
CAPEC-234: Hijacking a privileged process
CAPEC-251: Local Code Inclusion
CAPEC-253: Remote Code Inclusion
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
CAPEC-274: HTTP Verb Tampering
CAPEC-31: Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP Cookies
CAPEC-313: Active OS Fingerprinting
CAPEC-313: Passive OS Fingerprinting
CAPEC-443: Malicious Logic Inserted Into Product Software by Authorized
Developer
CAPEC-459: Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate
CAPEC-87: Forceful Browsing

Instances
9
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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